USS Maddox (DD-731), an Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer was named after Captain William A. T. Maddox of the United States Marine Corps.

Maddox screened the ships of the Fast Carrier Task Force during strikes against Japanese targets in the western Pacific. She was hit by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft off Formosa on 21 January 1945. Later, she covered the Marine landings at Okinawa and operated with the 7th Fleet in support of United Nations Forces during the Korean War. Maddox participated in the Blockade of Wonsan, an 861-day siege and bombardment of the city.

After 1953, she alternated operations along the west coast of the United States and in Hawaiian waters, with regular deployments to the western Pacific with the Seventh Fleet. Maddox departed Long Beach 13 March 1964. At first steaming with fast carrier groups in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, she headed south 18 May and established patrol off the coast of South Vietnam. During August she was involved in a skirmish with North Vietnamese torpedo boats, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and increased U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident (Vietnamese: Sự kiện Vịnh Bắc Bộ), was an international confrontation that led to the United States engaging more directly in the Vietnam War. It involved both a proven confrontation on August 2, 1964, carried out by North Vietnamese forces in response to covert operations in the coastal region of the gulf, and a second claimed confrontation on August 4, 1964, between ships of North Vietnam and the United States in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. Original American claims blamed North Vietnam for both attacks. Later investigation revealed that the second attack never happened; the American claim that it had was based mostly on erroneously interpreted communications intercepts.On August 2, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox, while performing a signals intelligence patrol as part of DESOTO operations, was approached by three Vietnam People's Navy torpedo boats of the 135th Torpedo Squadron. The Maddox fired warning shots and the North Vietnamese boats attacked with torpedoes and machine gun fire. In the ensuing engagement, one U.S. aircraft (which had been launched from aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga) was damaged, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats were damaged, and four North Vietnamese sailors were killed, with six more wounded. There were no U.S. casualties. Maddox was "unscathed except for a single bullet hole from a Vietnamese machine gun round".On August 4, 1964, destroyer USS Turner Joy joined Maddox on another DESOTO mission. That evening, the ships opened fire on confusing radar and sonar returns that had been preceded by communications intercepts suggesting that an attack was imminent. The commander of the Maddox task force, Captain John Herrick, reported that the ships were being attacked by North Vietnamese boats. In fact, there were no North Vietnamese boats present. While Herrick soon reported doubts regarding the task force’s initial perceptions of the attack, the Johnson administration relied on erroneously interpreted National Security Agency communications intercepts to conclude that the attack was real.While doubts regarding the perceived second attack have been expressed since 1964, it was not until years later that it was shown conclusively never to have happened. In the 2003 documentary The Fog of War, the former United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted that an attack on the USS Maddox happened on August 2, but the August 4 attack, for which Washington authorized retaliation, never happened. In 1995, McNamara met with former People's Army of Vietnam General Võ Nguyên Giáp to ask what happened on August 4, 1964. "Absolutely nothing", Giáp replied. Giáp claimed that the attack had been imaginary. In 2005, an internal National Security Agency historical study was declassified; it concluded that Maddox had engaged the North Vietnamese Navy on August 2, but that the perceived incident of August 4 was based on erroneous initial Navy perceptions and flawed interpretations of intercepts of North Vietnamese communications.The outcome of these two confrontations was the passage by U.S. Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose government was considered to be jeopardized by "communist aggression". The resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for deploying U.S. conventional forces and the commencement of open warfare against North Vietnam.